ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The persistent high budget deficits and the resultant increase in debt in developed and developing countries (including Nigeria) has motivated scholars in the fields of economics and political science to examine the likely factors (that is, economic, political, and institutional) that drive public sector budget deficits. Whereas economic theory postulates that economic boom leads to decline in budget deficits, this has not been the case as deficits continued to rise even after prosperity (Ali Bayar and Bram Smeets, 2009 ). The rise in budget deficits has partly been attributed to policy shifts planned by policy makers and the shocks in international and domestic variables which policy makers cannot influence (Marshall and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1989 ).
In the Nigeria's context, fiscal policy has tended to favour huge budget deficits, occasioned by the need to finance public (utilities) projects that government revenues are unable to finance. To this end, successive of GDP moved from -10.79 percentage in 1970 to -39.20 percentage in 1993 and -91.33 percentage in 1999 . The percentage of deficits in GDP was put at -69.58 percentage in 2002, -28.72 percentage in 2005 and -7 .02 percentage in 2008 (see appendix 1). In summary, despite the huge revenue generated from sales of crude oil, public sector deficits remain high in Nigeria.
The continuous accumulation of high budget deficits has re-shaped the thinking of researchers, as they attempt to analyze budget deficits from not only economic but also political and institutional perspectives (Ali Bayar and Bram Smeets, 2009 ). Some of the political and institutional variables include government's ideology, size of government, party system fragmentation, electoral cycles, presidential budgetary power, and the degree of public sector decentralization. Following the issues raised above, the main objective of this paper is to empirically examine the political and economic determinants of budget deficits in Nigeria.
The paper is organized as follows. Section one is the introduction, while section two contains the literature review and theoretical framework. Section three consists of model specification and estimation, while section four discusses the results and policy implications of findings. Section five is for recommendations and conclusion.
II. LITERATURE REvIEw AND THEORETICAL FRAMEwORk
Several researchers have examined the economic and political (including institutional) determinants of public sector governments resorted to various forms of deficit financing, through domestic and foreign borrowing, as well as printing of money. These practices led to accumulation of high debt, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. Couple with this, was the international shocks that resulted from declining oil prices and rising international interest rates, as well as declining inflows of international capital. The international shocks were soon felt in the domestic economy. For instance, falling oil prices and inadequate inflows of international capital led to decrease in government revenues. Besides, the increase in international interest rates had severe consequences on the economy as the interest payment on external debt increased the costs of debt servicing. These further re-enforce huge government debt and deficits. In order to resolve the crises and ensure fiscal adjustment, the federal government adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986. This amongst others was to reduce excessive (and unnecessary) government spending and to increase its revenue. Ellis and Schansberg (1999) focused on the determinants of fiscal deficit at the state level. The authors showed that high proportion of young voters is associated with high deficit. On the contrary, a large proportion of elderly voters was found to be related to lower deficit. Lastly, the authors illustrated that political factors are not important in explaining deficit at state level.
In Turkey, Yesim Kustepeli and Gulcan Onel (2005) evaluated the effects of political (parties) fragmentation on fiscal deficits during the period 1976-2004. The results revealed that the most important determinants of deficits is its lagged value. Moreover, the number of political parties in the government in power shows a little impact. The authors concluded that polarization, fragmentation and ideology of government have no significant influence on fiscal deficits. In Cote D'Ivoire, Oussou Kouassy and Bouabre Bohoun (1993) concentrated on the determinants of fiscal deficit and fiscal adjustment. The regression results indicate that public investment has a positive relationship with fiscal deficit. Similarly, tax rates are positively correlated to fiscal deficit. However, the GDP was shown to have a negative relationship with budget deficit. Roubini (1991) reported that fiscal deficits are partly determined by political factors and/or political instability. He concluded that increase in the degree of political instability appears to lead to greater budget deficits.
Peter Calgagno and Monica Escaleras (2005) used the index of political alternation (IPA) to measure political instability in the U.S. states. Their results revealed that political alternation creates instability which in turn has negative effect on fiscal performance in the U.S. states. In their work, Ali Salman Saleh and Charles Harvie (2005) advised that reducing government deficit can improve standard of living of the people. Unfortunately, due to political interferences, corruption, inadequate and inefficient governance system, it is difficult to adjust fiscal deficit in Lebanon. In Latin America, Acosta and Coppedge (2001) reported that large deficits are associated with election years. Secondly, the establishment of institutions designed to reduce deficits are important in reducing deficits. Other determinants of government deficits include size of the president's party, its degree of discipline, its loyalty to the president and the ideological position of the president. Mika Tujula and Guido Wolswijk (2004) showed that growth of government debt, macroeconomic development and political variables are the major determinants of budget balances in OECD countries. In addition, asset prices have been shown to be useful in explaining changes in government budget, but the effect is little. Marcela Eslava (2006) examined the effect of three possible determinants of fiscal balance, namely opportunistic behaviuor of policy makers, heterogeneous fiscal preferences of either voters or politicians, and the budget institutions. The author observed that lessfragmented governments and ability of voters to influence government fiscal policy tend to reduce budget deficits. Besides, the intervention of court in determining fiscal policy in order to increase spending so as to ensure constitutional rights leads to higher deficits. Roubini and Sachs (1989) examined the effects of structure of governments and political party fragmentation on government deficits. They found that higher number of political parties in government in power tend to raise budget deficits. In addition, in countries where government tenure is short, budget deficits tend to be large. Mink and De Haan (2005) confirmed that public sector deficits are higher in election years, while they remain low in the years preceding election.
In their work, Luca Agnello and Ricardo Sousa (2009) investigated the determinants of public deficit volatility. The authors illustrated that high level of political instability and less-democracy raise public sector deficit volatility. Furthermore, government deficit volatility is greater for small economies experiencing hyperinflation as well as those with high degree of openness. Some studies such as Aristovnik (2006) and Srdjan Redzepagic and Matthiew Llorca (2007) focused on fiscal sustainability.
Theoretical Framework
In his 'tax-smoothing' theory, Barro (1979) argued that, in an attempt to minimize distortions resulting from tax rates changes, government usually influence the size of budget deficits (or budget surplus). In order to maintain a balance or equilibrium in its expenditure and revenue, government employs a policy of budget deficit or surplus. On his part, Diokno (2007) opined that government runs deficits when national income is low or when government purchases are large. Thus, economic theory assigns an important role to temporary changes in revenue and expenditure in the explanation of budget deficit or surplus. However, Alesina and Perotti (1995) asserted that economic theory alone is inadequate in explaining changes in budget deficit, and therefore advised that both political and institutional factors be taken into consideration when discussing deficit issues. Supporting this claim, Ali Bayar and Bram Smeets (2009) pointed out that the tax-smoothing theory fails to explain the persistent deficits that accompanied the oil shocks of the 1970s.
III. Model Specification and Estimation
This paper uses the standard econometric model that has its basis from Roubini and Sachs (1989) , and later adopted by Yesim Kustepeli and Gulcan Onel (2005 stability. Moreover, government should give incentives and subsidies to producers in order to encourage production of goods and services. These incentives include among others low corporate profit tax, improvement in power and energy generation, etc.
In addition, we advise for proper management of both political and economic institutions in order to check deficits from rising, and government should secure more favourable interest rates on its debt so as to reduce future burden. These and many others would help to reduce government deficits. Lastly, although this paper contributes to the literature by examining the economic and political determinants of budget deficits, the author suggests that future research in this area should consider variables such as government's ideology, size of government, party system fragmentation, electoral cycles, presidential budgetary power, and the degree of public sector decentralization. Short Bio of Abu Nurudeen Abu Nurudeen has a bachelor and masters degrees in economics, from ahmadu bello university and university of abuja in nigeria, respectively. He is currently pursuing a doctoral degree in economics at the university of abuja Nigeria. He has authored and co-authored many papers.
